Download Ebook , by Laurence M. Ball
Download Ebook , by Laurence M. Ball
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, by Laurence M. Ball
Download Ebook , by Laurence M. Ball
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Product details
File Size: 3022 KB
Print Length: 280 pages
Page Numbers Source ISBN: 1108420966
Simultaneous Device Usage: Up to 4 simultaneous devices, per publisher limits
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (May 31, 2018)
Publication Date: May 8, 2018
Sold by: Amazon Digital Services LLC
Language: English
ASIN: B07BNSN18K
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Most people see the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers investment bank on September 15, 2008 as the event that turned a more or less normal recession into the Great Recession. Why didn't the Federal Reserve loan Lehman the funds that would have allowed the firm to survive long enough to gradually unwind its investments, find another financial firm to sell itself to, or, possibly, even survive long-term as an independent firm?Central banks were established to make loans to banks having liquidity problems. Banks are inherently illiquid because they borrow short term and lend long term. With commercial banks, the short-term borrowing mostly takes the form of deposits. Investment banks like Lehman borrowed short term by executing repurchase agreements (repos) with other financial firms. Repos are essentially overnight loans collateralized by securities such as Treasury bills.For decades, the Fed had been comfortable in its role of lender of last resort to commercials banks experiencing short-term liquidity problems caused by deposit withdrawals. In March 2008, as the repo market was experiencing problems, the Fed set up the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) to also provide liquidity to investment banks. But Fed officials interpreted the Federal Reserve Act as requiring that loans the Fed made through the PDCF have sufficient collateral to make repayment likely.So why did Fed Chair Ben Benanke and colleagues allow Lehman to fail rather than make the loans that would have allowed the firm to deal with its liquidity problems? The party line has been that Lehman lacked sufficient collateral, which left the Fed's hands tied. Bernanke has made this point multiple times in the years since 2008; arguing that legally the Fed could not make the loans that would have saved Lehman. He also claims that he was fully aware that the failure of Lehman would be catastrophic for the financial system and the economy.Laurence Ball argues -- not to put too fine a point on it -- that Bernanke is lying. Ball marshals considerable evidence to show that Lehman easily had sufficient collateral to back the loans it needed to survive, at least long enough to gradually unwind its investments. He also shows that at that time Fed officials never discussed the possibility that they lacked the legal authority to make the loans. Amazingly enough, Ball also shows that Bernanke was barely involved in the final decision to let Lehman fail. He also argues that neither Bernanke nor other Fed officials realized how big a blow to the financial system Lehman's failure would be, despite their later statements to the contrary.In Ball's telling, the decision to let Lehman fail -- actually, to actively push the firm into bankruptcy -- was made by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. Legally, it was strictly the Fed's decision whether or not to make the necessary loans. But through force of personality, Paulson took charge of the negotiations and made the key decisions. After the Treasury and Fed had taken action the previous spring to underwrite J.P. Morgan Chase's purchase of the Bear Sterns investment bank -- thereby saving Bear from bankruptcy -- Paulson had come under fierce public criticism. He told Fed officials that he refused to become known as Mr. Bailout by taking action to save Lehman. If Lehman was to survive, other financial firms would have to save it.Ball tells an amazing tale, which, if it becomes widely accepted, will deal a heavy blow to Bernanke's reputation. It will be interesting to see if Bernanke, Paulson, or other Fed officials respond. Ball's evidence seems overwhelming, so I have a feeling none of those folks will attempt to dispute his conclusions.The book is largely non-technical; Ball explains simply and clearly the financial basics necessary to understand his argument. He writes well and the book is a fast read. If I have one complaint, it's that he doesn't appear to have made much attempt to interview any of the many people he writes about. Nearly his entire argument is based on publicly available documents. He does say that "half a dozen people with first-hand knowledge" spoke to him, but only off the record. Ball is an academic, not a journalist, so perhaps it's unsurprising that he apparently didn't attempt to get a response from the main players.Still, that's a nitpick because this is a compelling book. The financial crisis is the most significant economic event in the lives of most Americans. I would think that many readers will want to know the truth behind its key event. I hope this book gains a wide readership.
Johns Hopkins economics professor Laurence Ball has written an extraordinarily well-researched book on the demise of Lehman Brothers. At the very least he seriously questions the official response to the Lehman bankruptcy which states that Lehman was insolvent and lacked adequate collateral on September 15, 2008 and at maximum he completely debunks the Fed and the Treasury. Although I am not in the complete debunking camp, Ball has certainly changed my views on the subject.Specifically Ball calculates that Lehman was borderline solvent at the time of the bankruptcy filing. In my own view based on Ball’s numbers I would have them more in the insolvent category because of the way Ball values Lehman’s Level 2 assets. Be that as it may, Ball is convincing when he argues that Lehman had sufficient collateral for a loan under the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) at the time of the filing and it certainly had the collateral when the requirements were eased two days later. Ball cogently argues that Maiden Lane rescue of Bear Stearns and the subsequent AIG rescue were far more risky for the Fed than a short-term loan to Lehman would have been.Then why didn’t the Fed at least temporarily bail out Lehman. To Ball it was pure politics with Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson leading the charge against any hint of a bailout. Put simply a Lehman bailout was viewed as politically toxic. And in fact, the consequences of letting Lehman go allowed the Congress to go forward with TARP and for the Fed to open the floodgate of cash under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. A year later New York Times columnist wrote “Lehman Had to Die, So Global Finance Could Live†(September 11, 2009). Put bluntly the chicken had to die.Ball argues that if the Fed intervened and kept Lehman alive, at least temporarily, the deluge that followed would have been averted. Here I respectfully disagree. AIG was already a goner and the markets would have immediately turned their attention to the severe problems at Morgan Stanley and Citigroup. Clearly stated, there were too many toxic assets awash in the system. All bailing out Lehman would have done would have been to delay the inevitable, which in my mind would have been far worse.Ball’s encyclopedic sources include all of Lehman’s SEC filings, the Valukas report, testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, the books by Bernanke, Paulson and Geithner and Andrew Ross Sorkin’s “Too Big To Fail.†One failing is that he should have talked to Lehman’s CEO Dick Fuld. In my view Fuld was so full of himself that he refused to see the writing on the wall and held out for too high of a price in his failed attempt secure financing for Lehman in 2008. Further exacerbating the situation is that Fuld was hardly the most agreeable person around and likely rubbed his regulators and the other major firms the wrong way. In the interest of full disclosure I was a managing director at Lehman from 2000 – 2005.Ball’s book is very detailed and the writing leaves out the high drama of the situation making it very text bookie and slow going. Nevertheless the facts speak for themselves.
Outstanding account of the Lehman bankruptcy. The author persuasively argues that permitting Lehman to fail was a bad decision that adversely affected the US economy for many years and could have been avoided. The author shows that Ben Bernanke's purported rationale for failing to provide financial backing for Lehman when the repo market collapsed & Lehman was unable to obtain short term funding -- that he did not have legal authority and that Lehman did not have sufficient collateral -- are both false and that both rationales were concocted after the fact. Rather Bernanke seems to have been pushed into permitting Lehman to collapse by Henry Paulson, the Secretary of the Treasury, because Paulson was afraid of political backlash from both the left and the right for supposed "bailouts." The author parses through the evidence carefully and fairly and does not seem to have an ax to grind. His writing is clear and to the point. This book is a model for economic history.
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